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06 OCT, 2026
On 25th March 2026, FCA published the consultation paper ‘CP26/10: Simplifying the pension and investment advice rules’, which outlined how the regulator would be consulting on firms being able to give more simplified forms of advice to consumers. This wide-ranging paper proposed simplification of the current rules on pensions and investment advice, which are found in the Conduct of Business Sourcebook (COBS).
The proposed new unified ‘COBS 9C’ chapter reflects a shift in regulatory emphasis: away from process for its own sake and towards a more proportionate, risk-based assessment of what is needed to deliver a suitable outcome. That direction is welcome, but its success will depend on whether firms feel able to use professional judgement without creating unacceptable retrospective risk.
Three proposals illustrate how the FCA is seeking to translate that ambition into practice:
Taken together, these changes could remove unnecessary friction from simple advice journeys. Yet the underlying principle is not that less information or fewer controls are inherently better. It is that the process should be no more extensive than the client, recommendation and foreseeable risks require. Where the circumstances or transaction are more complex, existing expectations and the need for a fuller assessment will remain.
The challenge is that principles-based flexibility can feel less reassuring than a prescriptive rulebook. Firms may agree with the policy intent but still default to established processes if the boundary of acceptable judgement remains uncertain. The FCA’s proposed case studies and ‘safe harbours’ could therefore be pivotal, but regulatory guidance alone may not be enough. Industry confidence is also likely to depend on whether the FOS provides a clear and consistent account of how proportionate decisions will be assessed after the event. Without that alignment, simplification may exist in the rules but not in firms’ processes.
The proposal to replace a strict ‘annual’ review requirement with an obligation to offer ‘periodic’ reviews is designed to increase flexibility rather than create a requirement to re-write existing service propositions. It challenges the assumption that frequency is, by itself, evidence of value and asks a more useful question: how often does this client need advice for the service to remain suitable and of value?
For some clients there may well be a credible case for greater flexibility. A younger client in the accumulation phase, making regular contributions to a straightforward investment strategy, may not need the same review frequency as someone whose circumstances, income requirements or portfolio are changing more rapidly. Used well, a periodic model could widen access, release adviser capacity and align the cost of ongoing advice more closely with the work genuinely required.
But flexibility must not become a rationale for delivering less while charging the same. A reduction in review frequency should be seen through the lens of the four outcomes of Consumer Duty, who is new service right for; will it deliver fair value; do the clients understand the new terms and charges; and are they supported with the move the new arrangement.
For firms, this points towards a potential segmentation exercise, or review, rather than wholesale change. No action should be taken before the final rules are confirmed, and any future move from annual suitability assessments to periodic reviews will need to be demonstrably in the client’s interests and supported by an updated agreement where required. Retaining annual reviews should not be seen as a failure to simplify; where a client’s needs justify closer oversight, that frequency remains a legitimate part of the proposition and its value story.
That is absolutely correct. In our view, the position is materially different in decumulation. Once a client begins drawing on their assets, advice is no longer concerned only with whether an investment remains suitable over the long term. It must also address the interaction between withdrawals, market movements, tax allowances, cash reserves and evolving income needs. Decisions made—or left unexamined—can have consequences that are difficult to reverse.
For clients in drawdown, review frequency can itself be a risk-control measure. Regular withdrawals during a period of poor investment performance can accelerate capital depletion, while changes in spending, health, family circumstances or other income may alter what is sustainable. A longer interval between formal reviews could allow a previously reasonable withdrawal strategy, cash-flow plan or asset allocation to drift out of alignment before the firm and client revisit it.
The same caution applies to clients with more complex financial portfolios. Multiple wrappers, higher-risk products, guarantees, tax considerations or interdependent objectives create more points at which circumstances can change—and more scope for one decision to affect another.
In such cases, the right question is not how infrequently a review can be delivered, but what frequency is needed to identify foreseeable harm and support good outcomes. In many cases this will be at least annual if not more frequent.
Periodic reviews may be a valuable option, but they should be positioned as targeted proportionality, not as a new default.
Whilst it is important to acknowledge that these FCA proposals are currently only at consultation stage, if they become a reality, firms should consider the most appropriate review frequency across differing client types.
Identifying the drivers for adopting potentially less frequent reviews (lower-risk portfolios, simpler products) and triggers for potentially increasing the frequency of reviews (income drawdown, IHT) will become important and having possession of strong know your customer information with clearly outlined, quantified objectives will become key as this will likely contribute to determining the suitability of the service being offered.
Increased flexibility can introduce a more complex review structure and potentially an increased risk of following the wrong process or, in terms of ongoing reviews, non-delivery of services. If this increased flexibility is introduced, we would expect that controls around the advice process, client segmentation and managing ongoing reviews would need to be reviewed, modified and managed.
In reality, we believe that firms will likely be fairly cautious about moving too far from current practices until there is clarity around both market activity and supervisory expectations.
Overall, the proposals offer a useful opportunity to make advice more proportionate, but only if firms apply that flexibility carefully. A simpler advice process or a more flexible review frequency should be driven by client need, risk and complexity, supported by strong KYC, clear segmentation, fair pricing and effective controls. In our view simpler clients may benefit from these changes, however for those in drawdown, or with more complex requirements, the current regulatory framework is likely to remain the most suitable solution.